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Bolei Di1 and Andrew Lamperski2
Abstract— Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with
differing objectives choose control inputs to a dynamic sys-
tem. Dynamic games model a wide variety of applications in
economics, defense, and energy systems. However, compared
to single-agent control problems, the computational methods
for dynamic games are relatively limited. As in the single-agent
case, only very specialized dynamic games can be solved exactly,
and so approximation algorithms are required. This paper
extends the differential dynamic programming algorithm from
single-agent control to the case of non-zero sum full-information
dynamic games. The method works by computing quadratic
approximations to the dynamic programming equations. The
approximation results in static quadratic games which are
solved recursively. Convergence is proved by showing that
the algorithm iterates sufficiently close to iterates of Newton’s
method to inherit its convergence properties. A numerical
example is provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic games arise when multiple agents with differing
objectives act upon a dynamic system. In contrast, optimal
control can be viewed as the specialization of dynamic games
to the case of a single agent. Dynamic games have many
applications including pursuit-evasion [1], active-defense [2],
[3], economics [4] and the smart grid [5]. Despite a wide
array of applications, the computational methods for dynamic
games are considerably less developed than the single-agent
case of optimal control.
This paper shows how the differential dynamic program-
ming (DDP) method from optimal control [6] extends to
discrete-time non-zero sum dynamic games. Closely related
works from [7], [8] focus on the case of zero-sum dynamic
games. Classical differential dynamic programming operates
by iteratively solving quadratic approximations to the Bell-
man equation from optimal control. Our method applies sim-
ilar methods to the generalization of the Bellman equation for
dynamic games [9]. Here, at each stage, the algorithm solves
a static game formed by taking quadratic approximations to
the value function of each agent. We show that the algorithm
converges quadratically in the neighborhood of a strict Nash
equilibrium. To prove convergence, we extend arguments
from [10], which relate DDP iterates to those of Newton’s
method, to the case of dynamic games. In particular, we
extend the recursive solution for Newton’s method [11] to
dynamic games, and demonstrate that the solutions produced
Newton’s method and the DDP method are close.
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A. Related Work
A great deal of work on algorithmic solutions to dynamic
games has been done. This subsection reviews related work
which is a bit more removed from the closer references
described above. As we will see, most works solve somewhat
different problems compared to the current paper.
Methods for finding Nash equilibria via extremum seek-
ing were presented in [12], [13], [14]. In particular, the
controllers drive the states of a dynamic system to Nash
equilibria of static games. A related method for linear
quadratic games was presented in [15]. For these works, each
agent only requires measurements of its own cost. However,
it is limited to finding equilibria in steady state. Our method
requires each agent to have explicit model information, but
gives equilibria over finite horizons. This is particularly
important for games in which trajectories from initial to final
states are desired.
Several works focus on the solution to dynamic potential
games. Potential games are more tractable than general
dynamic games, as they can be solved using methods from
single-agent optimal control [16], [17], [18], [19], [20],
[21]. However, potential games satisfy restrictive symmetry
conditions. In particular, the assumption precludes interesting
applications with heterogeneous agents.
B. Paper Outline
The general problem is formulated in Section II. The algo-
rithm is described in Section III and the convergence proof
is sketched in Section IV. A numerical example is described
in V. Conclusions and future directions are discussed in VI
while the proof details are given in the appendix.
II. DETERMINISTIC NONLINEAR DYNAMIC
GAME PROBLEM
In this section, we introduce deterministic finite-horizon
nonlinear game problem, the notations for the paper, the
solution concept and convergence criterion of our proposed
method.
The main problem of interest is a deterministic full-
information dynamic game of the form below.
Problem 1: Nonlinear dynamic game
Each player tries to minimize their own cost
Jn(u) =
T
∑
k=0
cn,k(xk,u:,k) (1)
Subject to constraints
xk+1 = fk(xk,u:,k) (2a)
x0 is fixed. (2b)
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Here, the state of the system at time k is denoted by xk ∈Rnx .
Player n’s input at time k is given by un,k ∈ Rnun . The
vector of all player actions at time k is denoted by: u:,k =
[u>1,k,u
>
2,k, . . . ,u
>
N,k]
> ∈ Rnu . The cost for player n at time k
is cn,k(xk,u:,k). This encodes the fact that the costs for each
player can depend on the actions of all the players.
In later analysis, some other notation will be help-
ful. The vector player n’s actions over all time is de-
noted by un,: = [u>n,0,u
>
n,1, . . . ,u
>
n,T ]
>. The vector of all ac-
tions other than those of player n is denoted by u−n,: =
[u>1,:, . . . ,u
>
n−1,:,u
>
n+1,:, . . . ,u
>
N,:]
>. The vector of all states is
denoted by x= [x>0 ,x
>
1 , . . . ,x
>
T ]
> while the vector of all inputs
is given by u = [u>1,:,u
>
N,:, . . . ,u
>
N,:]
>.
Note that since the initial state is fixed and the dynamics
are deterministic, the costs for each player can be expressed
as functions of the vector of actions, Jn(u).
A local Nash equilibrium for problem 1 is a set of inputs
u? such that
Jn(un,:,u?−n,:)≥ Jn(u?), n = 1,2, . . . ,N (3)
for all un,: in a neighborhood of u?n,:. In the context of
dynamic games, this correponds to an open-loop, local Nash
equilibrium [9]. The equilibrium is called a strict local Nash
equilibrium if the inequality in (3) is strict for all un,: 6= u?n,:
in a neighborhood of u?n,:.
In this paper, we focus on computing Nash equilibria by
solving the following necessary conditions for local Nash
equilibria:
Problem 2: Necessary conditions
∂Jn
∂un,:
= 0 (4)
for n = 1, . . . ,N.
For convenient notation, we stack all of the gradient
vectors from (4) into a single vector:
J (u) =
[
∂J1
∂u1,:
∂J2
∂u2,:
· · · ∂JN∂uN,:
]>
. (5)
Thus, the necessary condition is equivalent to J (u) = 0.
Such conditions arise in works such as [22], [23].
We will present a method for solving these necessary
conditions for a local Nash equilibrium via differential
dynamic programming (DDP). In principle, an input vector
satisfying the necessary conditions J (u) = 0 could be
found via Newton’s method. Similar to the single-player case
from [10], we analyze the convergence properties of DDP
by proving that its solution is close to that computed by
Newton’s method.
To guarantee convergence, we assume thatJ (u) satisfies
the smoothness and non-degeneracy conditions required by
Newton’s method [24]. For smoothness, we assume that
J (u) is differentiable with locally Lipschitz derivatives.
For non-degeneracy, we assume that ∂J (u
∗)
∂u is invertible. A
sufficient condition for the smoothness assumptions is that
the functions fk and cn,k are twice continuously differentiable
with Lipschitz second derivatives. In our DDP solution, we
will solve a sequence of stage-wise quadratic games. As we
will see, a sufficient condition for invertibility of ∂J (u
∗)
∂u
is the unique solvability of the stage-wise games near the
equilibrium.
III. DIFFERENTIAL DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
ALGORITHM
This section describes the differential dynamic program-
ming algorithm for dynamic games of the form in Problem 1.
Subsection III-A gives a high-level description of the algo-
rithm, while Subsection III-B describes the explicit matrix
calculations used in algorithm.
A. Algorithm Overview
The equilibrium solution to the general dynamic game can
be characterized by the Bellman recursion:
V ?n,T+1(xT+1) = 0 (6a)
Q?n,k(xk,u:,k) = cn,k(xk,u:,k)+V
?
n,k+1( fk(xk,u:,k)) (6b)
V ?n,k(xk) = minun,k
Q?n,k(xk,u:,k). (6c)
In particular, if a solution to the Bellman recursion is found,
the corresponding optimal strategy for player n at time k
would be the un,k which minimizes Q?n,k(xk,u:,k). Note that
(6c) defines a static game with respect to the u:,k variable at
step k.
The idea of the differentiable dynamic programming
(DDP) is to maintain quadratic approximations of V ∗n,k and
Q∗n,k denoted by V˜n,k and Q˜n,k, respectively.
We need some notation for our approximations. For a
scalar-valued function, h(z), we denote the quadratic approx-
imation near z¯ by:
quad(h(z))z¯ =
1
2
[
1
δ z
]>[ 2h(z¯) ∂h(z¯)∂ z
∂h(z¯)
∂ z
> ∂ 2h(z¯)
∂ z2
][
1
δ z
]
(7a)
δ z =z− z¯. (7b)
If h : Rn → Rm we form the quadratic approximation by
stacking all of the quadratic approximations of the entries:
quad(h(z))z¯ = [quad(h1(z))z¯, . . . ,quad(hm(z))z¯]> (8)
Let
zk =
[
xk
u:,k
]
(9)
and let x¯k and u¯:,k be a trajectory of states and actions
satisfying the dynamic equations from (2). The approximate
Bellman recursion around this trajectory is given by:
V˜n,T+1(xT+1) = 0 (10a)
Q˜n,k(zk) = quad(cn,k(zk)+V˜n,k+1( fk(zk)))z¯k (10b)
V˜n,k(xk) = minun,k
Q˜n,k(xk,u:,k). (10c)
Note that (10c) is now a quadratic game in the u:,k
variables which has unique and ready solution [9]. Recall
the J (u) function defined in (5). A sufficient condition for
solvability of these games is given in terms ofJ (u) is given
in the following lemma. Its proof is in Appendix I-D.
Lemma 1: If ∂J (u¯)∂u is invertible, the game defined by
(10c) has a unique solution of the form:
u:,k = u¯:,k + K˜kδxk + s˜k. (11)
In the notation defined above, we have that δxk = xk− x¯k.
Note that if ∂J (u
?)
∂u is invertible, then
∂J (u¯)
∂u is invertible for
all u¯ in a neighborhood of u?.
Here we provide the DDP algorithm for applying DDP
game solution in pseudo code.
Algorithm 1 Differential Dynamic Programming for Non-
linear Dynamic Games
Generate an initial trajectory x¯, u¯
loop
Backward Pass:
Perform the approximate Bellman recursion from (10)
Compute K˜k and s˜k from (11).
Forward Pass:
Generate a new trajectory using the affine policy
defined by K˜k, s˜k
end loop
B. Implementation Details
All of the operations in the backwards pass of the DDP
algorithm, Algorithm 1, can be expressed more explicitly in
terms of matrices.
To construct the required matrices, we define the following
approximation terms:
Ak =
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∣∣∣
u¯
, Bk =
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
(12a)
Glk =
 ∂
2 f lk
∂x2k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,k∂xk
∂ 2 f lk
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣∣
u¯
, l = 1,2, . . . ,nx (12b)
Rk(δxk,δu:,k) =

[
δxk
δu:,k
]T
G0k
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
[
δxk
δu:,k
]T
G1k
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
...[
δxk
δu:,k
]T
Gnxk
[
δxk
δu:,k
]

(12c)
Mn,k =

2cn,k
∂cn,k
∂xk
∂cn,k
∂u:,k
∂cn,k
∂xk
> ∂ 2cn,k
∂x2k
∂ 2cn,k
∂xk∂u:,k
∂cn,k
∂u:,k
> ∂ 2cn,k
∂u:,k∂xk
∂ 2cn,k
∂u2:,k

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u¯
(12d)
=
M11n,k M1xn,k M1un,kMx1n,k Mxxn,k Mxun,k
Mu1n,k M
ux
n,k M
uu
n,k
 .
Using the notation from (7), (8) and (9), the second-order
approximations of the dynamics and cost are given by:
quad( fk(zk))z¯k = fk(z¯k)+Akδxk +Bkδu:,k +Rk(δ zk) (13a)
quad(cn,k(zk))z¯k =
[
1
δ zk
]>
Mn,k
[
1
δ zk
]
. (13b)
By construction V˜n,k(xk) and Q˜n,k(xk,u:,k) are quadratic,
and so there must be matrices S˜n,k and Γ˜n,k such that
V˜n,k(xk) =
1
2
[
1
δxk
]> [S˜11n,k S˜1xn,k
S˜x1n,k S˜
xx
n,k
][
1
δxk
]
(14a)
Q˜n,k(xk,u:,k) =
1
2
 1δxk
δu:,k
> Γ˜n,k
 1δxk
δu:,k
 . (14b)
Lemma 2: The matrices in (14) are defined recursively by
S˜n,T+1 = 0 and:
D˜n,k =
nx
∑
l=1
S˜1x
l
n,k+1G
l
k (15a)
Γ˜n,k = Mn,k
+
 S˜11n,k+1 S˜1xn,k+1Ak S˜1xn,k+1BkA>k S˜x1n,k+1 A>k S˜xxn,k+1Ak + D˜xxn,k A>k S˜xxn,k+1Bk + D˜xun,k
B>k S˜
x1
n,k+1 B
>
k S˜
xx
n,k+1Ak + D˜
ux
n,k B
>
k S˜
xx
n,k+1Bk + D˜
uu
n,k

(15b)
=

Γ˜11n,k Γ˜
1x
n,k Γ˜
1u1
n,k Γ˜
1u2
n,k · · · Γ˜1uNn,k
Γ˜x1n,k Γ˜
xx
n,k Γ˜
xu1
n,k Γ˜
xu2
n,k · · · Γ˜xuNn,k
Γ˜u11n,k Γ˜
u1x
n,k Γ˜
u1u1
n,k Γ˜
u1u2
n,k · · · Γ˜u1uNn,k
Γ˜u21n,k Γ˜
u2x
n,k Γ˜
u2u1
n,k Γ˜
u2u2
n,k · · · Γ˜u2uNn,k
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
Γ˜uN 1n,k Γ˜
uN x
n,k Γ˜
uN u1
n,k Γ˜
uN u2
n,k · · · Γ˜uN uNn,k

(15c)
F˜k =

Γ˜u1u1,k
Γ˜u2u2,k
...
Γ˜uN uN,k
=

Γ˜u1u11,k Γ˜
u1u2
1,k · · · Γ˜u1uN1,k
Γ˜u2u12,k Γ˜
u2u2
2,k · · · Γ˜u2uN2,k
...
...
. . .
...
Γ˜uN u1N,k Γ˜
uN u2
N,k · · · Γ˜uN uNN,k
 (15d)
P˜k =

Γ˜u1x1,k
Γ˜u2x2,k
...
Γ˜uN xN,k
 , H˜k =

Γ˜u111,k
Γ˜u212,k
...
Γ˜uN 1N,k
 (15e)
s˜k =−F˜−1k H˜k, K˜k =−F˜−1k P˜k (15f)
S˜n,k =
[
1 0 s˜>k
0 I K˜>k
]
Γ˜n,k
1 00 I
s˜k K˜k
 , (15g)
for k = T,T −1, . . . ,0.
Proof: By construction we must have S˜n,T+1 = 0.
Plugging (13a) into (15b) and dropping all cubic and higher
terms gives (10b). Since u:,k = u¯:,k+δu:,k and u¯:,k is constant,
the static game defined in (10c) can be solved in the
δu:,k variables. Differentiating (14b) by δun,k, collecting the
derivatives for all players and setting them to zero leads to
the necessary condition for an equilibrium:
F˜kδu:,k + P˜kδxk + H˜k = 0. (16)
Thus, the matrices for the equilibrium strategy are given in
(15f). Plugging (11) into (14b) leads to (15g).
Remark 1: The next section will describe how the al-
gorithm converges to strict Nash equilibria if it begins
sufficiently close. To ensure that the algorithm converges
regardless of initial condition, a Levenberg-Marquardt style
regularization can be employed. Such regularization has been
used in centralized DDP algorithms, [25], [26], to ensure that
the required inverses exist and that the solution improves. In
the current setting, such regularization would correspond to
using a regularization of the form F˜k +λ I where λ ≥ 0 is
chosen sufficiently large to ensure that the matrix is positive
definite.
IV. CONVERGENCE
This section outlines the convergence behavior of the DDP
algorithm for dynamic games. The main result is Theorem 1
which demonstrates quadratic convergence to local Nash
equilibria:
Theorem 1: If u? is a strict local equilibrium such that
∂J (u∗)
∂u is invertible, then the DDP algorithms converges
locally to u? at a quadratic rate.
The proof depends on several intermediate results. Subsec-
tion IV-A reformulates Newton’s method for the necessary
conditions, (4), as the solution to a dynamic game. Subsec-
tion IV-B demonstrates that the solutions of the dynamic
games solved by Newton’s method and DDP close. Then,
Subsection IV-C finishes the convergence proof by demon-
strating that the DDP solution is sufficiently close to the
Newton solution to inherit its convergence property.
Throughout this section we will assume that both New-
ton’s method and DDP are starting from the same initial
action trajectory, u¯. Let uN and uD be the updated action tra-
jectories of Newton’s method and DDP, respectively. Define
update steps, δuN and δuD, by:
uN = u¯+δuN uD = u¯+δuD. (17)
Additionally, we will assume that u? is a strict local equilib-
rium with ∂J (u
∗)
∂u invertible.
A. Dynamic Programming Solution for the Newton Step
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by demonstrating that
the solutions from DDP and Newton’s method are suffi-
ciently close that DDP inherits the quadratic convergence
of Newton’s method. To show closeness, we demonstrate
that the Newton step can be interpreted as the solution to a
dynamic game. This dynamic game has a recursive solution
that is structurally similar to the recursions from DDP. This
subsection derives the corresponding game and solution.
The Newton step for solving (4) is given by:
∂J (u¯)
∂u
δuN =−J (u¯). (18)
This rule leads to a quadratic convergence to a root in (4)
whenever ∇uJ (u) is locally Lipschitz and invertible [24].
The next two lemmas give game-theoretic interpretations of
the Newton step.
Lemma 3: Solving (18) is equivalent to solving the
quadratic game defined by:
min
δun,:
Jn(u¯)+
∂Jn(u¯)
∂u
δu+
1
2
δuT
∂ 2Jn(u¯)
∂u2
δu (19)
Proof: Under the strict local equilibrium assumptions,
(19) has a unique solution which is found by differentiating
with respect to δun,: and setting the result to 0. Stacking
these equations leads precisely to (18).
The next lemma shows that (19) can be expressed as a
quadratic dynamic game. It is proved in Appendix I-A.
Lemma 4: The quadratic game defined in (19) is equiva-
lent to the dynamic game defined by:
min
un,:
1
2
T
∑
k=0
 1δxk
δu:,k
T Mn,k
 1δxk
δu:,k
+M1xn,k∆xk
 (20a)
subject to
δx0 = 0 (20b)
∆x0 = 0 (20c)
δxk+1 = Akδxk +Bkδu:,k (20d)
∆xk+1 = Ak∆xk +Rk(δxk,δu:,k) (20e)
k = 0,1, . . . ,T (20f)
Note that the states of the dynamic game are given by δxk
and ∆xk as
δxk =
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,i (21a)
∆xlk =
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xlk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:, j, l = 1,2, . . . ,nx (21b)
It follows that the equilibrium solution of this dynamic
game is characterize by the following Bellman recursion:
Vn,T+1(δxT+1,∆xT+1) = 0 (22a)
Qn,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) =
1
2

 1δxk
δu:,k
>Mn,k
 1δxk
δu:,k
+M1xn,k∆xk
 (22b)
+Vn,k+1(Akδxk +Bkδu:,k,Ak∆xk +Rk(δxk,δu:,k)) (22c)
Vn,k(δxk,∆xk) = min
δun,k
Qn,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k). (22d)
Note that (22d) defines a static quadratic game and
Vn,k(δxk,∆xk) is found by solving the game and substituting
the solution back to Qn,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k).
The next lemma describes an explicit solution to the
backward recursion (22). The key step in the convergence
proof is showing that the matrices used in this recursion are
appropriately close to the matrices used in DDP.
Lemma 5: The functions Vn,k and Qn,k can be expressed
as
Vn,k(δxk,∆xk) =
1
2
([
1
δxk
]T
Sn,k
[
1
δxk
]
+Ωn,k∆xk
)
(23a)
Qn,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) =
1
2
 1δxk
δu:,k
T Γn,k
 1δxk
δu:,k
+Ωn,k∆xk

(23b)
where the matrices Sn,k, Γn,k, and Ωn,k are defined recusrively
by Sn,T+1 = 0, Ωn,T+1 = 0, and
Ωn,k = M1xn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak (24a)
Dn,k =
n
∑
l=1
Ωln,k+1G
l
k (24b)
Γn,k = Mn,k
+
 S11n,k+1 S1xn,k+1Ak S1xn,k+1BkA>k Sx1n,k+1 A>k Sxxn,k+1Ak +Dxxk A>k Sxxn,k+1Bk +Dxuk
B>k S
x1
n,k+1 B
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Ak +D
ux
k B
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Bk +D
uu
k

(24c)
=

Γ11n,k Γ
1x
n,k Γ
1u1
n,k Γ
1u2
n,k · · · Γ1uNn,k
Γx1n,k Γ
xx
n,k Γ
xu1
n,k Γ
xu2
n,k · · · ΓxuNn,k
Γu11n,k Γ
u1x
n,k Γ
u1u1
n,k Γ
u1u2
n,k · · · Γu1uNn,k
Γu21n,k Γ
u2x
n,k Γ
u2u1
n,k Γ
u2u2
n,k · · · Γu2uNn,k
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΓuN 1n,k Γ
uN x
n,k Γ
uN u1
n,k Γ
uN u2
n,k · · · ΓuN uNn,k

(24d)
Fk =

Γu1u1k
Γu2u2k
...
ΓuN uNk
=

Γu1u11k Γ
u1u2
1k · · · Γu1uN1k
Γu2u12k Γ
u2u2
2k · · · Γu2uN2k
...
...
. . .
...
ΓuN u1Nk Γ
uN u2
Nk · · · ΓuN uNNk
 (24e)
Pk =

Γu1x1k
Γu2x2k
...
ΓuN xNk
 , Hk =

Γu111k
Γu212k
...
ΓuN 1Nk
 (24f)
sk =−F−1k Hk, Kk =−F−1k Pk (24g)
Sn,k =
[
1 0 s>k
0 I K>k
]
Γn,k
1 00 I
sk Kk
 (24h)
for k = T,T −1, . . . ,0.
From this lemma, we can see that the matrices used in
the recursions for both DDP and Newton’s method are very
similar in structure. Indeed, the iterations are identical aside
from the definitions of the Dn,k and D˜n,k matrices.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof for Lemma
2. Solving the equilibrium strategy and Vn,k(δxk,∆xk) based
on Qn,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) is the same as how we arrived at
(16) and (15g), since the extra terms of ∆xk are not coupled
with δu:,k and other terms are of the exact same form. The
stepping back in time of Qk(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) is acheived by
substituting (20d) and (20e) into (23a), which is slightly
different because of the extra terms related to ∆xk.
Qn,k(δxk,∆xk,δu:,k) (25a)
=
1
2
 1δxk
δu:,k
T Mn,k
 1δxk
δu:,k
+M1kn,k∆xk

+Vn,k+1(Akδxk +Bkδuk,Ak∆xk +Rk(δxk,δu:,k)) (25b)
=
1
2
 1δxk
δu:,k
T Mn,k
 1δxk
δu:,k
+
1
2
 1δxk
δu:,k
T  S11n,k+1 S1xn,k+1Ak S1xn,k+1BkA>k Sx1n,k+1 A>k Sxxn,k+1Ak A>k Sxxn,k+1Bk
B>k S
x1
n,k+1 B
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Ak B
>
k S
xx
n,k+1Bk
 1δxk
δu:,k

+
1
2
(
(M1kn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak)∆xk
)
+
1
2
([
δxk
δu:,k
]T
Dn,k
[
δxk
δu:,k
])
(25c)
So (24a), (24b) and (24c) are true.
B. Closeness Lemmas
This subsection gives a few lemmas which imply that the
Newton step, δuN , and the DDP step, δuD, are close. For
the rest of the section, we set ‖u¯−u?‖= ε .
The following lemma shows that the matrices used in the
backwards recursion are close. It is proved in Appendix I-B
Lemma 6: The matrices from the backwards recursions of
DDP and Newton’s method are close in the following sense:
Γ˜n,k−Γn,k
=
Γ˜11n,k Γ˜1xn,k Γ˜1un,kΓ˜x1n,k Γ˜xxn,k Γ˜xun,k
Γ˜u1n,k Γ˜
ux
n,k Γ˜
uu
n,k
−
Γ11n,k Γ1xn,k Γ1un,kΓx1n,k Γxxn,k Γxun,k
Γu1n,k Γ
ux
n,k Γ
uu
n,k
 (26a)
=
O(ε) O(ε2) O(ε2)O(ε2) O(ε) O(ε)
O(ε2) O(ε) O(ε)
 , (26b)
S˜n,k−Sn,k =
[
S˜11n,k S˜
1x
n,k
S˜x1n,k S˜
xx
n,k
]
−
[
S11n,k S
1x
n,k
Sx1n,k S
xx
n,k
]
(26c)
=
[
O(ε) O(ε2)
O(ε2) O(ε)
]
, (26d)
[
s˜n,l K˜n,k
]− [sn,l Kn,k]= [O(ε2) O(ε)] . (26e)
Furthermore, the following matrices are small:[
Γ1xn,k Γ
1,u
n,k
]
= O(ε),
[
Γ˜1xn,k Γ˜
1,u
n,k
]
= O(ε) (26f)
sn,k = O(ε), s˜n,k = O(ε). (26g)
After showing that the matrices are close, it can be shown
that the states and actions computed in the update steps are
close. It is proved in Appendix I-C.
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Fig. 1. Owner-dog dynamic game. In order to keep the dog around x1 = 2,
the owner has to overshoot and then come back to x0 = 1. The dog learns to
get closer to the owner over iterations, which is what we would expect given
how the problem is formulated. As can be seen in Fig. 1(b), the cumulative
costs for both players reduces over iterations.
Lemma 7: The states and actions computed by DDP and
Newton’s method are close:
δuD:,k−δuN:,k = O(ε2) (27a)
δxDk −δxNk = O(ε2) (27b)
Furthermore, the updates are small:
δuD:,k = O(ε), δu
N
:,k = O(ε) (27c)
δxDk = O(ε), δx
N
k = O(ε). (27d)
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 7 implies that ‖δuN−δuD‖=O(ε2). Furthermore,
the Newton step satisfies:
‖u¯+δuN−u?‖= O(ε2). (28)
See [24]. The proof of quadratic convergence is completed
by the following steps:
‖u¯+δuD−u?‖= ‖u¯+δuN−u?+δuD−δuN‖ (29a)
≤ ‖u¯+δuN−u?‖+‖δuD−δuN‖ (29b)
= O(ε2). (29c)
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We apply the proposed DDP algorithm for deterministic
nonlinear dynamic games to a toy examples in this section.
The example is impletmented in Python and all derivatives
of nonlinear functions are computed via Tensorflow [27].
We consider a simple 1-D owner-dog problem, with hori-
zon T = 11 and initial state x:,0 = [−1,2] where the dynamics
of both the owner and the dog are given respectively by
x0k+1 = x
0
k + tanhu
0
k (30a)
x1k+1 = x
1
k + tanhu
1
k (30b)
The owner cares about going to x0 = 1 and that the dog
can stay at x1 = 2. The dog, however, only tries to catch
up with the owner. Each player also concerns itself with the
energy consumption, therefore has a cost term related to the
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10 2
10 1
100
di
st
an
ce
 to
 e
qu
ilib
riu
m
Fig. 2. This shows the 2-norm distance between inputs u¯ and the final
equilibrium u? over iterations. As can be seen that the error reduces sub-
linearly on a log scaled plot, which is evidence that the algorithm converges
quadratically.
magnitude of its input. Their cost functions are formulated
as
c0,k(x,u) = 10 sigmoid((x0k−1)2)+40(x1k−2)2+(u0k)2
(31a)
c1,k(x,u) = tanh2(x0k− x1k)+(u1k)2 (31b)
Nonlinear functions are added to the dynamics and costs
to create a nonlinear game rather than for explicit physical
meaning. We initialize a trajectory with zero input and initial
state, i.e. u¯ = [0.,0., . . . ,0.] and x¯ = [−1,2,−1,2, . . . ,−1,2].
We used an identity regularization matrix with a magnitude
of 400.
Fig. 1 shows the solution via DDP to this problem over
iterations, where the more transparent the trajectories, the
earlier in the iterations they are. The starred trajectory is the
final equilibrium solution. We simulated 100 iterations after
the initial trajectory and picked 10 uniformly spaced ones to
show in the figures.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown how differential dynamic
programming extends to dynamic games. The key steps were
involved finding explicit forms for both DDP and Newton
iterations that enable clean comparison of their solutions. We
demonstrated the performance of the algorithm on a simple
nonlinear dynamic game.
Many extensions are possible. We will examine larger
examples and work on numerical scaling. Also of interest
are stochastic dynamic games and problems in which agents
have differing, imperfect information sets. Additionally, han-
dling scenarios in which agents have imperfect model infor-
mation will of great practical importance.
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APPENDIX I
PROOFS OF LEMMAS
We first derive a few useful results which we’ll use later
in this chapter.
First, we bound the spectral radius of F−1k from above
ρ(F−1k )≤ Fˆ (32)
where Fˆ is a constant. Consider inverting ∇uJ (u) in New-
ton’s method by successively eliminating δu:,k for k= T,T−
1, . . . ,0. The Fk matrices are exactly the matrices which
would be inverted when eliminating δu:,k. Since ∇uJ (u) is
Lipschitz continuous, its eigenvalues are bounded away from
zero in a neighborhood of u?. It follows that the eigenvalues
of FK must also be bounded away from zero and F−1k is
bounded above.
Secondly, we assert that
Ωn,k =
∂
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k
cn,i(xi,u:,i) (33)
which means Ωn,k captures the first-order effect of xk on the
sum of all later costs for each player. Ωn,k is constructed
according to (24a). Equation (33) is true for k = T by
construction. We proof by induction and assume that (33)
holds for k+1, i.e. Ωn,k+1 = ∂∂xk+1
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
∑Ti=k+1 cn,i(xi,u:,i), then
Ωn,k = Mn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak (34a)
=
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
+
(
∂
∂xk+1
T
∑
i=k+1
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
)
∂xk+1
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(34b)
=
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
+
(
∂
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k+1
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
)
(34c)
=
∂
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k
cn,i(xi,u:,i) (34d)
Therefore, (33) holds for k. And by induction, all k =
0,1, . . . ,T .
The third useful result is that
M1un,k +Ωn,k+1Bk =
∂Jn(u)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
= O(ε) (35)
∂Jn(u)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
= O(ε) is true because Jn(u) is twice differentiable
hence Lipschitz, i.e.∣∣∣∣∣∣Jn(u)∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
− Jn(u)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u?
∣∣∣∣∣∣2 ≤ constant · ‖u¯−u?‖2 = O(ε) (36)
The first equality holds because
∂J(u)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
u¯
=
∂
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=0
cn,i(xi,u:,i) =
∂
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
(37a)
=
∂
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
cn,k(xk,u:,k)+
∂
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k+1
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
(37b)
=M1un,k +
∂
∂xk+1
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=k+1
cn,i(xi,u:,i)
∂xk+1
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
(37c)
=M1un,k +Ωn,k+1Bk (37d)
These results are used implicitly in the later proofs of
lemmas.
A. Proof of Lemma 4
First, we prove that the dynamics constraints (20d) and
(20e) are inductive definitions of the following approxima-
tion terms:
δxk =
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,i (38a)
∆xlk =
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xlk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:, j, l = 1,2, . . . ,nx (38b)
Note that x0 is fixed so that (38) holds at k = 0. Now we
handle each of the terms inductively.
For δxk+1, we have
δxk+1 =
T
∑
i=0
∂xk+1
∂u:,i
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,i
=
T
∑
i=0
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,i
=
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,k
δu:,i+
∂ fk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
δu:,k
= Akδxk +Bkδu:,k (39)
We used the fact that ∂ f (xk,u:,k)∂u:,i is zero unless i = k.
For ∆xk+1, row l is given by:
∆xlk+1 =
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2 f lk(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j (40a)
=
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
(
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
+(
∂xk
∂u:,i
)>
∂ 2 f lk
∂x2k
∂xk
∂u:, j
)∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
(
(
xk
∂u:,i
)>
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:, j
+
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,i∂xk
xk
∂u:, j
)∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
(
nx
∑
p=1
∂ f lk
∂xpk
∂ 2xpk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
)∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j (40b)
= δu>:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u2:,k
δu:,k +δx>k
∂ 2 f lk
∂x2k
δxk +δx>k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
δu:,k
+δu>:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,k∂xk
δxk +
nx
∑
p=1
∂ f lk
∂xpk
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xpk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
δu:, j
(40c)
=
[
δxk
δu:,k
]>
Glk
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
+
nx
∑
p=1
Al pk ∆x
p
k (40d)
To get to each terms in (40c), we used the fact that
∂ 2 f lk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
= 0, for i 6= k or j 6= k (41a)
δxk =
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
δu:,i =
k−1
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
δu:,i (41b)
To get to (40d), we used the fact
∂ f lk
∂xpk
= Al pk (42a)
T
∑
i=0
T
∑
j=0
δu>:,i
∂ 2xpk
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j = ∆xpk (42b) ∂
2 f lk
∂x2k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2 f lk
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣∣
x¯,u¯
= Glk (42c)
Both l and p are used to pick out the corresponding element
for a vector or matrix. Al pk means the lth row and pth column
of matrix Ak. Equation (40d) actually describes each element
in (38b), so we’ve proven that both are true.
Next we prove (20a) is the quadratic approximation of
Jn(u), i.e.
quad(Jn(u))u¯ = Jn(u¯)+
∂JTn (u¯)
∂u
+
1
2
δuT
∂ 2Jn(u¯)
∂u2
δu
=
1
2
T
∑
k=0
 1δxk
δu:,k
T Mn,k
 1δxk
δu:,k
+M1kn,k∆xk
 (43)
We’ll need the explicit expressions for the associated
derivatives.
∂Jn(u)
∂u:,i
=
T
∑
k=0
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i
+
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∂xk
∂u:,i
)
(44a)
∂ 2Jn(u)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
=
T
∑
k=0
(
∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
+
∂xk
∂u:,i
> ∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂x2k
∂xk
∂u:, j
)
+
T
∑
k=0
(
∂xk
∂u:,i
> ∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk∂u:, j
+
∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂xk
∂xk
∂u:, j
)
+
T
∑
k=0
nx
∑
l=1
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xlk
∂ 2xlk
∂u:,i∂u:,i
(44b)
We break down each term in (43). First the second order
term.
δuT
∂ 2Jn(u¯)
∂u2
δu =
T
∑
i, j=0
δuT:,i
∂ 2Jn(u)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣∣
u¯
δu:, j (45a)
=
T
∑
i, j,k=0
δuT:,i
(
∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂u:, j
∣∣∣∣
u¯
)
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i, j,k=0
δuT:,i
(
∂xk
∂u:,i
> ∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂x2k
∣∣∣∣
u¯
∂xk
∂u:, j
)
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i, j,k=0
δuT:,i
(
∂xk
∂u:,i
> ∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk∂u:, j
∣∣∣∣
u¯
)
δu:, j
+
T
∑
i, j,k=0
δuT:,i
(
∂ 2cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i∂xk
∣∣∣∣
u¯
∂xk
∂u:, j
)
δu:, j
+
T
∑
k=0
n
∑
p=1
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xpk
∣∣∣∣
u¯
T
∑
i, j=0
δuT:,i
∂ 2xpk
∂u:,i∂u:,i
δu:, j (45b)
=
T
∑
k=0
(
δu>:,k
∂ 2cn,k
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣
u¯
δu:,k +δx>k
∂ 2cn,k
∂x2k
∣∣∣∣
u¯
δxk
)
+
T
∑
k=0
(
δx>k
∂ 2cn,k
∂xk∂u:,k
|u¯δu:,k +δu>:,k
∂ 2cn,k
∂u:,k∂xk
∣∣∣∣
u¯
δxk
)
+
T
∑
k=0
n
∑
p=1
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xpk
∆xpk (45c)
=
T
∑
k=0
[ δxkδu:,k
]T  ∂
2cn,k
∂x2k
∂ 2cn,k
∂xk∂u:,k
∂ 2cn,k
∂u:,k∂xk
∂ 2cn,k
∂u2:,k
∣∣∣∣
u¯
[
δxk
δu:,k
]
+
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∆xk
)
(45d)
The first term in (45b) to (45c) holds because cn,k(xk,u:,k)
only depends directly on u:,i and u:, j when i = j = k. The
others hold because xk only depends on u:,i and u:, j when
i, j < k. The last term uses the definition of ∆xk in (38b).
The first order term
∂Jn(u¯)
∂u
=
T
∑
i=0
∂Jn(u)
∂u:,i
δu:,i (46a)
=
T
∑
i,k=0
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,i
+
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
∂xk
∂u:,i
)
δu:,i (46b)
=
T
∑
k=0
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
δu:,k +
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
T
∑
i=0
∂xk
∂u:,i
)
(46c)
=
T
∑
k=0
(
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂u:,k
δu:,k +
∂cn,k(xk,u:,k)
∂xk
δxk
)
(46d)
And constant term
Jn(u¯) =
T
∑
k=0
cn,k(x¯k, u¯:,k) (47)
From (45), (46), and (47) it follows that (43) is true.
B. Proof of Lemma 6
A more complete version of Lemma 6 is
D˜n,k = Dn,k +O(ε) (48a)
S1xn,k =Ωn,k +O(ε) (48b)
S˜1xn,k =Ωn,k +O(ε) (48c)
S˜1xn,k = S
1x
n,k +O(ε
2) (48d)
S˜n,k = Sn,k +O(ε) (48e)[
Γ˜1xn,k Γ˜
1u
n,k
]
=
[
Γ1xn,k Γ
1u
n,k
]
+O(ε2) (48f)
Γ˜n,k = Γn,k +O(ε) (48g)
Γ1un,k = O(ε) (48h)
Γ˜1un,k = O(ε) (48i)
F˜k = Fk +O(ε) (48j)
P˜k = Pk +O(ε) (48k)
H˜k = Hk +O(ε2) (48l)
H˜k = O(ε) (48m)
Hk = O(ε) (48n)
s˜k = sk +O(ε2) (48o)
s˜k = O(ε) (48p)
sk = O(ε) (48q)
K˜k = Kk +O(ε), (48r)
of which we give a proof by induction for in this section.
For k = T , because of the way these variables are con-
structed, they are identical, i.e.
Γn,T =Γ˜n,T (49a)
FT =F˜T (49b)
PT =P˜T (49c)
HT =H˜T (49d)
sT =s˜T (49e)
KT =K˜T (49f)
Sn,T =S˜n,T (49g)
So we have (48d)(48e)(48f)(48g)(48j)(48k)(48l)(48o)(48r)
hold for k = T .
We also know that
M1un,T =
∂cn,T
∂uT
=
∂Jn(u)
∂uT
= O(ε) (50)
where the first equality is by construction, the second is true
because uT only appears in Jn(u) in cn,T . By construction,
Γ1un,T = Γ˜1un,T =M1un,T =O(ε), so (48h)(48i) are true for k = T .
Similarly, HT and H˜T are constructed from Γu1n,T and Γ˜u1n,T ,
so (48m)(48n) are true for k = T .
Because F−1k is bounded above, sT = −F−1T HT =
−F−1T O(ε) = O(ε). Similarly, s˜T = O(ε). Equations
(48p)(48q) are true for k = T .
From (24h) and Γn,T = Mn,T , we can get
S1xn,T =M
1x
n,T +M
1u
n,T KT + s
>
T (M
ux
n,T +M
uu
n,T KT ) (51a)
=Ωn,T +O(ε)KT +O(ε)(Muxn,T +M
uu
n,T KT ) (51b)
=Ωn,T +O(ε) (51c)
because Mn,T is bounded. Hence (48b) is true. Further, (48c)
is also true.
The time indices for Dn,T−1 and D˜n,T−1 go to a maximum
of T−1, so to prove things inductively, we need (48a) to hold
for k= T−1.The difference between constructions of Dn,T−1
and D˜n,T−1 is in that the former uses Ωn,T and the later uses
S˜1xn,T . But since we’ve proven Ωn,T = S˜1xn,T +O(ε), and GT−1
is bounded, we can also conclude Dn,T−1 = D˜n,T−1 +O(ε).
Therefore (48a) is true for k = T −1.
So far, we’ve proved that for the last step, either k = T
or k = T − 1, (48) is true. Assuming except for (48a), (48)
is true for k+1 and (48a) is true for k. If we can prove all
equations hold one step back, our proof by induction would
be done.
Assume (48a) holds for k and other equations in (48) hold
for k+1. Readers be aware that we’ll use these assumptions
implicitly in the derivations following.
From (24c) we can get
Γ1un,k =M
1u
k,T +S
1x
n,k+1Bk (52a)
=M1uk,T +Ωn,k+1Bk +O(ε)Bk (52b)
=O(ε) (52c)
Here we used (35). Similarly, we can prove Γ˜1un,k = O(ε). So
(48h) and (48i) hold for k.
From (24c) and (15b) we can compute the difference
between Γ˜n,k and Γn,k as
Γ˜n,k−Γn,k
=
 S˜11n,k+1−S11n,k+1 0 0A>k (S˜x1n,k+1−Sx1n,k+1) 0 0
B>k (S˜
x1
n,k+1−Sx1n,k+1) 0 0

+
0 (S˜1xn,k+1−S1xn,k+1)Ak 00 A>k (S˜xxn,k+1−Sxxn,k+1)Ak +(D˜xxk −Dxxk ) 0
0 B>k (S˜
xx
n,k+1−Sxxn,k+1)Ak +(D˜uxk −Duxk ) 0

+
0 0 (S˜1xn,k+1−S1xn,k+1)Bk0 0 A>k (S˜xxn,k+1−Sxxn,k+1)Bk +(D˜xuk −Dxuk )
0 0 B>k (S˜
xx
n,k+1−Sxxn,k+1)Bk +(D˜uuk −Duuk )
 (53a)
=
 O(ε) AkO(ε2) BkO(ε2)A>k O(ε2) A>k O(ε)Ak +O(ε) A>k O(ε)Bk +O(ε)
B>k O(ε
2) B>k O(ε)Ak +O(ε) B
>
k O(ε)Bk +O(ε)

(53b)
=
O(ε) O(ε2) O(ε2)O(ε2) O(ε) O(ε)
O(ε2) O(ε) O(ε)
 (53c)
from which we can see that (48f) and (48g) are true. Once we
proved the closeness between Γ˜n,k and Γn,k and the specific
terms are O(ε), i.e. (48f) to (48i), because of they way they
are constructed from Γ˜n,k and Γn,k, we are safe to say
F˜k = Fk +O(ε) (54a)
P˜k = Pk +O(ε) (54b)
H˜k = Hk +O(ε2) (54c)
H˜k = O(ε) (54d)
Hk = O(ε) (54e)
Therefore, (48j), (48k), (48l), (48m) and (48n) are true for
k.
Now that we have the results with Fk, F˜k, Hk, H˜k, Pk and
P˜k, we can move to what are immediately following, i.e. sk,
s˜k, Kk and K˜k.
sk =−F−1k Hk =−F−1k O(ε) = O(ε) (55)
which is true because F−1k is bounded above. Similarly, we
have s˜k = O(ε). Equations (48p) and (48q) are true.
s˜k =−F˜−1k H˜k =−(Fk +O(ε))−1(Hk +O(ε2)) (56a)
=−(F−1k +O(ε))(Hk +O(ε2)) (56b)
=−F−1k Hk +F−1k O(ε2)+HkO(ε)+O(ε2) (56c)
= sk +O(ε2) (56d)
K˜k =−F˜−1k P˜k =−(Fk +O(ε))−1(Pk +O(ε)) (56e)
=−(F−1k +O(ε))(Pk +O(ε)) (56f)
=−F−1k Pk +(F−1k +Pk)O(ε)+O(ε2) (56g)
= Kk +O(ε) (56h)
Equations (48o) and (48r) are true for k.
Now we are equipped to get closeness/small results for
Sn,k and S˜n,k.
S˜n,k−Sn,k
=
[
1 0 0
0 I K˜>k
]
Γ˜n,k
1 00 I
0 K˜k
−[1 0 0
0 I K>k
]
Γn,k
1 00 I
0 Kk

+
[
s˜>k Γ˜
uu
n,k s˜k +2s˜
>
k Γ˜
u1
n,k− s>k Γuun,ksk−2s>k Γu1n,k 0
(Γ˜xun,k + Γ˜
uu
n,kK˜k)s˜k− (Γuxn,k +Γuun,kKk)>sk 0
]
+
[
0 s˜>k (Γ˜
ux
n,k + Γ˜
uu
n,kK˜k)− s>k (Γuxn,k +Γuun,kKk)
0 0
]
(57a)
=
[
Γ˜11n,k Γ˜
1x
n,k + Γ˜
1u
n,kK˜
Γ˜x1n,k + K˜
>Γ˜u1n,k Γ˜
xx
n,k +2Γ˜
xu
n,kK˜+ K˜
>Γ˜uun,kK˜
]
−
[
Γ11n,k Γ
1x
n,k +Γ
1u
n,kK
Γx1n,k +K
>Γu1n,k Γ
xx
n,k +2Γ
xu
n,kK+K
>Γuun,kK
]
+
[
O(ε) O(ε2)
O(ε) 0
]
(57b)
=
[
O(ε) O(ε2)
O(ε2) O(ε)
]
(57c)
(57d)
So that (48d) and (48e) are true for k.
S1xn,k = M
1x
n,k +S
1x
n,k+1Ak +Γ
1u
n,kKk + s
>
k (Γ
ux
n,k +Γ
uu
n,kKk) (58a)
= M1xn,k +Ωn,k+1Ak +AkO(ε)
+KkO(ε)+(Γuxn,k +Γ
uu
n,kKk)O(ε) (58b)
=Ωn,k +O(ε) (58c)
Therefore, (48b) holds and then naturally (48c) holds.
We continue to prove that D˜n,k−1 and Dn,k−1 are close,
which is true because
D˜n,k−1 =
nx
∑
l=1
S˜1x
l
n,kG
l
k (59a)
=
nx
∑
l=1
(Ωln,k +O(ε))G
l
k (59b)
=
nx
∑
l=1
Ωln,kG
l
k +O(ε) (59c)
=Dn,k−1+O(ε) (59d)
So (48a) is true.
C. Proof of Lemma 7
A more complete version of Lemma 7 is
δxDk+1 =Akδx
D
k +Bkδu
D
k +O(ε
2) (60a)
δxNk+1 =Akδx
N
k +Bkδu
N
k +O(ε
2) (60b)
δuNk = O(ε) (60c)
δuDk = O(ε) (60d)
δxNk = O(ε) (60e)
δxDk = O(ε) (60f)
δuNk −δuDk =O(ε2) (60g)
δxNk −δxDk =O(ε2) (60h)
δuN−δuD =O(ε2) (60i)
‖u¯+δuN−u?‖=O(ε2). (60j)
‖u¯+δuD−u?‖=O(ε2). (60k)
Equation (60a) comes directly from the Taylor series
expansion of (2) and (60b) from (20d).
We prove (60c) to (60h) by induction. For k = 0, δxN0 =
δxD0 = 0 and δu
N
0 = s0, δx
D
0 = s˜0. We know from the proof
of lemma 6 that s0 = s˜0 +O(ε2), s0 = O(ε) and s˜0 = O(ε),
so (60c) to (60h) hold for k = 0. Assume (60c) to (60h) hold
for k, then
δuNk+1 = Kk+1δx
N
k + sk+1 = O(ε) (61a)
δuDk+1 = K˜k+1δx
N
k + s˜k+1 = O(ε) (61b)
δxNk+1 =Akδx
N
k +Bkδu
N
k +O(ε
2) = O(ε) (61c)
δxDk+1 =Akδx
D
k +Bkδu
D
k +O(ε
2) = O(ε) (61d)
δuNk+1−δuDk+1 =KkδxNk − K˜kδxDk + sk− s˜k (61e)
=KkδxNk − (Kk +O(ε))(δxNk +O(ε2))
+O(ε2) (61f)
=O(ε)δxNk +O(ε
2) (61g)
=O(ε2) (61h)
δxNk+1−δxDk+1 =Ak(δxNk −δxDk )+Bk(δuNk −δuDk )+O(ε2)
=O(ε2) (61i)
So (60c) to (60h) hold for k+1 and the proof by induction
is done. Equation (60i) comes directly as a result. Equation
(60j) is classic convergence analysis for Newton’s method
[24]. Equation (60k) follows directly from (60i) and (60j).
D. Proof of Lemma 1
As discussed in the proof of Lemma 2, a necessary
condition for the solution of (10c) is given by (16). Thus,
a sufficient condition for a unique solution is that F˜k be
invertible. At the beginning of the appendix, whe showed that
F−1k exists near u
? and that its spectral radius is bounded.
Now we show that F˜k exists and ρ(F˜−1k ) is bounded.
Lemma 6 implies that F˜k = Fk +O(ε). It follows that
F˜−1k = (Fk +O(ε))
−1 = F−1k −F−1k O(ε)F−1k = F−1k +O(ε).
It follows that F˜−1k exists and is bounded in a neighborhood
of u?.
